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nside the animal’s form sits the brain, its work
broadly to increase the animal’s grip on the world about
it,and hardly less the grip of the external world upon the
animal.
Sherrington,Rede Lecture,1933
Modern times are not like the times in which our ances-
tors evolved.The environment of evolutionary adaptation
(EEA) usually refers to the habitat of our immediate
ancestors who are thought to have been hunter-gatherers
living in bands of about 50 adults,but is really an abstrac-
tion which covers all environmental influences going back
over three hundred million years to the common ancestor
of humans and present-day reptiles. The “mismatch”
between now and the EEA is thought to be one cause of
psychopathology.“Bad news”is a source of anxiety.We
now have daily,or even hourly,access to the bad news of
six billion people, more than could be generated by a
hunter-gatherer band.Moreover,in the EEA,bad news
was probably discussed and so shared with other group
members,whereas modern man tends to watch it or listen
to it on his own,or at least without comment.Therefore,
as a practicing clinician,I advise all my anxious patients to
avoid watching TV news, and I find that many of them
have learned the lesson for themselves.They realize that
each item of bad news raises their background level of
anxiety,and,of course,severely depressed patients may
believe that they are personally responsible for the dis-
asters that occur daily around the globe. No one, to my
knowledge, has done a controlled trial of “news avoid-
ance”as an item of therapy.
Much has been written about the evolution of anxiety
and its disorders.
1-10 Here,rather than repeating familiar
arguments,I have tried to break some new ground,look-
ing at approaches that may be relevant to research and
treatment.I will concentrate on social aspects of anxiety,
because nonsocial anxieties have been well covered,
whereas there is still something to say about social anxi-
ety,particularly the relation of social anxiety disorder to
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Danger and harm are avoided by strategic decisions made
at all three levels of the triune forebrain: rational (neo-
mammalian), emotional (paleomammalian), and instinc-
tive (reptilian). This applies also to potential harm from
conspecifics, which leads to a choice between escalating
and de-escalating strategies. Anxiety is a component of
de-escalating strategies mediated by the paleomam-
malian and reptilian forebrains. When the neomam-
malian (rational) brain fails to deal with the threat of con-
specific danger, these more primitive de-escalating
strategies may be activated and may present as anxiety
disorders. The capacity for concealment of anxiety and
other forms of negative affect has also evolved, and exces-
sive concealment may lead to psychopathology by break-
ing the negative feedback loop of excessive motivation,
leading to impaired performance, leading to signals of
distress, and  leading to reduced exhortation to succeed
on the part of parents and teachers; this situation is illus-
trated by a model based on the Yerkes-Dodson law. 
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anxiety to depression, and the relation of anxiety and
depression to social competition.Evolution is history,and
our speculations about how and why certain things
evolved cannot be tested directly.As W.H.Auden said,
“History is,strictly speaking,the study of questions;the
study of answers belongs to anthropology and sociology.”
In the case of evolutionary history,answers are also pro-
vided by psychology and physiology.Evolutionary spec-
ulations are heuristic,in the sense that they may lead to
the posing of questions which otherwise would not have
been thought of.The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
Generalized anxiety disorder
Here is an example of how contemplation of the EEA
may generate ideas.A team from the University of British
Columbia construed GAD as an unsuccessful search for
safety.
11 They addressed “three distinctive features of
GAD:the undue persistence of the anxiety and worry;the
excessive generality of the anxiety, and the lackluster
response of GAD to cognitive therapy procedures […]
People with GAD persist in multiple,persistent searches
for safety,but they seldom succeed in achieving lasting
satisfaction.”The big question is:where does safety come
from? This becomes clear if we imagine that during part
of the EEA human beings went through a stage of living
in hierarchically organized groups,much as most monkeys
and apes do today. In such a group, most rewards are
dependent on the animal’s social rank, and the only
means of social advancement is to rise in rank.An ambi-
tious chimpanzee challenges the animal who ranks above,
who probably resists the challenge,and a ritualized fight
ensues.This may go on and off for many months, until
either the challenger gives up,or the higher-ranking ani-
mal is deposed.The two then undergo what the prima-
tologist de Waal has called “conditional reconciliation”:
they kiss and hug and make up,but with the understand-
ing that the deposed animal is now subordinate; this
means that the subordinate animal has to behave sub-
missively to an animal he may have dominated for some
years.
12-14 If we consider the state of mind of the deposed
animal after he has been beaten,but before he has rec-
onciled,we can see the need for some reorganization of
goals and attitudes: we have suggested that depressed
mood may help the animal give up the goal of retaining
his high rank,and reconcile him to his inferior social posi-
tion.
15 However,the depression does not help him recon-
cile with his supplanter.Here there is a role for general-
ized anxiety,with its frantic search for safety.There is only
one source of safety in the chimpanzee world,and that is
from the victorious animal, and so the deposed animal
turns to the victor for reassurance and protection,and is
so needful of safety that he accepts the terms of the con-
ditional reconciliation,and his gratitude for the relief of
anxiety overcomes his resentment at being deposed.In
this hypothetical situation,we can see how depression and
anxiety can work together to achieve what has been
called “functional agonism.”
16
Such a scenario has been reported in a street-corner
gang,
17 which is probably the nearest that human society
gets to a chimpanzee group. However, most human
social life is infinitely complex and the simple situation
of the chimpanzee or the human gang cannot be dis-
cerned.From the research point of view,our ideas stress
the importance of the work carried out by Gilbert and
his colleagues in Derby,UK,
18 and others,
19 into the rela-
tion between depressed and anxious mood and submis-
sive behavior. From the treatment point of view, we
endorse the approach of interpersonal psychotherapy,
which explores current conflicts in the lives of patients.
20
Unresolved rebellions against parents and other power-
ful people should be explored.Also,given that in human
society,it is often the group as a whole,rather than indi-
viduals,who exercise power,the patient’s relations with
“authority” should be examined, and, for instance, any
questionable self-assertion should be avoided, such as
submitting inflated expense accounts or massaged (false)
tax returns.This is similar to the suggestion of Buss
21 that
anxiety helps prevent unattractive, incompetent, or
deviant people from being excluded from their group;
anxiety may not make people more attractive and com-
petent,but it can make them less deviant,and it can help
to reconcile unattractive group members to a more sub-
ordinate role in which they may be better tolerated.
One cannot help noticing that in a Christian country,many
of the population submit to a powerful figure every week,
confessing their sins,going through a ritual not unlike the
conditional reconciliation of the chimpanzee.One recalls
that C.S.Lewis,in The Problem of Pain,concluded that
the function of mental pain is to reconcile man to God.
Lewis,having experienced severe depression,concluded
that man is so proud and arrogant that to achieve submis-
sion even this degree of mental pain is required.
Submission to a cult leader and his beliefs, or to a psy-
chotherapist and his theories,may achieve a similar result.
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iety work synergistically together to promote functional
agonism, whereby rank differences are maintained and
rank reversals are achieved without group disruption.
Depression prevents rebellion and generalized anxiety
promotes reconciliation, so that a hierarchy based on
reassurance, gratitude, and respect can replace either
social chaos or a hierarchy based on intimidation.
Groups with such “hedonic” hierarchies are likely to
outcompete groups with agonistic hierarchies,so that the
effect of selection between groups will be added to the
individual advantage of the anxious person (avoiding
punishment or exclusion by a more powerful person or
by the group as a whole) and these advantages have pre-
sumably,during the course of evolution,outweighed the
disadvantage of giving up the resources that are the
rewards of high social rank.This synergistic action of
depression and anxiety is compatible with the finding of
extensive comorbidity between anxiety states and
depressive disorders,
22-25 and with the finding that the
genetic predisposition to major depression is indistin-
guishable from the predisposition to GAD.
22
Social anxiety disorder
I have suggested above that GAD plays a part in man-
aging the organization of a social hierarchy, and pro-
motes reconciliation with a successful rival.Thus, it is
concerned with social change.Social anxiety disorder is
also concerned with avoiding harm from conspecifics,
but is concerned with social homeostasis.The difference
is one between anxious mood and anxious emotion.An
emotion is directed at an object, and is sensitive to
changes in the object, whereas a mood is unfocused or
self-focused, and is unaffected by changes in the envi-
ronment.
26 It is likely that emotions and moods are medi-
ated by different levels of the brain,and in order to illus-
trate this I will use MacLean’s model of the triune
brain,
27,28 suggesting that depressed emotion and anxious
emotion are mediated by the paleomammalian fore-
brain, whereas depressed mood and anxious mood are
mediated by reptilian forebrain.
A triune mind in a triune brain
In order to comprehend clearly the human response to
danger,and to see anxiety in the context of all the mech-
anisms deployed in the avoidance of danger,it is neces-
sary to invoke the concept of the triune mind.
29,30The idea
that the mind consists of two or more relatively inde-
pendent entities has been around at least since the time
of Plato.
31This has been most pithily expressed by Pascal
in his aphorism,“The heart has its reasons which the rea-
son knows nothing of.”Ancient Eastern philosophers,
whose ideas were largely promulgated in the West by
Gurdjieff,used the metaphor of the cart,horse,and dri-
ver.
30The driver represented reason,or the rational mind,
but he had only limited control over the horse,who rep-
resented the emotional mind (located in the heart),who
in turn had limited control of the cart,representing the
instinctive mind,located by some in the gut.Plato likened
the three minds to different organs of state.
31
The work of the evolutionary neuroanatomist MacLean
has given support to the idea of the triune mind by his
demonstration of a triune brain.
27 Prior to MacLean, it
was thought that over the course of evolution the brain
had gradually grown in size, with the later additions on
the whole controlling the earlier parts,largely by inhibi-
tion.MacLean pointed out that the forebrain had grown
in three distinct stages,leaving three “central processing
assemblies,” which relatively independently respond to
changes in the environment. Firstly, the reptilian fore-
brain evolved from the fish and amphibian brains and
concerned itself,as far as social relations went,with the
courtship of the opposite sex, and competition with the
same sex by means of agonistic behavior.This brain is
present in all reptiles, birds, and mammals, and in
humans it occupies the basal ganglia or corpus striatum.
Then,instead of a homogeneous accretion of additional
brain volume, there developed a “paleomammalian
brain,”which dealt with mammalian social life,the fam-
ily,the parent/offspring bond,and such social matters as
were no (or little) part of reptilian social life.This brain
is situated in the limbic system.Not only did it deal with
mammalian matters, but it also dealt, in a mammalian
way,with those problems which had been faced by rep-
tiles and were also faced by mammals,such as the avoid-
ance of danger, the courtship of the opposite sex, and
competition with the same sex; however, at the same
time,the reptilian brain continued to deal with the same
old problems in its old reptilian way.In higher mammals,
there developed the neomammalian brain, which sub-
serves what we recognize as rational thought and deci-
sion-making, and it brings these capacities to bear not
only on modern problems such as technology and liti-
gation,but also on the older problems that are addressed
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avoidance of danger, courtship, and competition.This
neomammalian brain is situated in the neocortex.
Thus,we have three brains dealing with the same prob-
lems,and to some extent they cooperate,but also to some
extent they act independently.They have different sources
of information,they make different executive decisions,
and they have different representations in awareness.This
is quite a surprising situation, one that would not have
been predicted,say,by an engineer accustomed to design-
ing robots.The most surprising thing is that the rational
brain,which appears to be the most sophisticated think-
ing machine ever to have evolved, has so little control
over the two lower brains.The driver is not in control of
the horse or the cart. It would have been easy for such
control to have evolved,so the fact that it has not evolved
suggests that there is some advantage in having one or
more relatively independent lower “central processing
assemblies.” In the case of danger avoidance, there is
some advantage in speed of reaction,so that avoidance
occurs rapidly before the more sophisticated,but slower,
neomammalian brain can take action.However,there is
also a sense in which the lower brain “knows better,”hav-
ing sources of information not available to the higher
brain.This seems to be particularly true in the case of
avoiding danger from conspecifics.In competitive rela-
tions with conspecifics, a decision frequently has to be
made between escalation (fighting harder) and de-esca-
lation (fleeing or submitting),and this decision appears to
be made,relatively independently,by each of the three
brains,sometimes sequentially,sometimes simultaneously
(Table I).
Since anxiety may be a component of the de-escalation
response, it is necessary to say something about escala-
tion and de-escalation, which are familiar concepts in
ethology
32 and behavioral ecology,
33 but have not yet
been clearly formulated in psychology.
Escalation and de-escalation
For over three hundred million years, competition
between members of the same sex has taken the form of
agonistic behavior, and, from observation of countless
species of existing mammals and reptiles,ethologists have
pointed out that this behavior is ritualized,in the sense
that it obeys certain rules.One of these rules is that each
individual has a limit in the punishment he is able to
receive before switching from escalation to de-escalation.
Another rule is that when one contestant submits, the
winner exercises mercy and does not take advantage of
any submissive posture adopted by the loser.
In a contest,there is usually mutual signaling of resource-
holding potential (RHP),which is an estimate of fighting
capacity,and if there is a significant difference in RHP
Basic research
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Table I. Escalating and de-escalating strategies at three brain levels: agonistic competition.
The triune model for escalation/de-escalation: agonistic competition
Escalate De-escalate
Rational level (isocortex) Decide to fight on  or Decide to back off 
(stubbornness or courage) (submission or escape)
Emotional level (limbic system) Feel assertive, angry, or hostile or Feel inferior 
(anxiety, depressed emotion)
Instinctive level (basal ganglia) Elevated mood or Depressed mood, 
anxious mood
Table II. Escalating and de-escalating strategies at three brain levels: prestige competition.
The triune model for escalation/de-escalation: prestige competition
Escalate De-escalate
Rational level (isocortex) Adopt new goals, actively pursue  or Give up goals, efface oneself
existing goals, assert oneself
Emotional level (limbic system) Feel assertive, exhilarated, and enthusiastic or Feel inferior (shame/guilt/sense 
of failure, social anxiety)
Instinctive level (basal ganglia) Elevated mood or Depressed mood 
and anxious moodbetween two contestants,the one with less RHP usually
backs off before any engagement starts.Or,if the contest
occurs on a territory owned by one contestant,there is a
convention that the owner of the territory wins.If terri-
tory is not an issue, and RHP is equal, a fight ensues,
which may escalate through several stages of fighting
behavior,such as the roaring of stags,
34 which is followed
by parallel walking,which is followed by locking horns.
Each contestant is giving out punishment to the other,
and receiving punishment in return.When does one of
them give up? This interesting value has been honed by
hundreds of million years of evolution,but for simplic-
ity’s sake can be expressed in terms of “punishment units
received,”a value which is determined partly by the ani-
mal’s motivation (the value to the animal of what is being
fought over,a quantity known as resource value),partly
by ontogenetic experience, and partly by heredity.
35
Assuming the resource to be of equal value to both con-
testants,and their life experience to have been equiva-
lent,the deciding factor,according to behavioral ecolo-
gists, is either genetically determined or randomized
according to a genetically determined schedule,and the
contestant with the greater capacity to endure punish-
ment before submitting is said to adopt a hawk strategy,
while the contestant with the lesser capacity, and who
therefore submits, is said to adopt a dove strategy.
Adopting reasonable parameters,a mixture of hawk and
dove strategies is evolutionarily stable
36 (whether the
mixture is between individuals or within individuals on
different occasions does not matter).Hawk and dove are
graded characters,so that in any contest,an individual is
likely to be confronted with an opponent who is either
more hawkish or less hawkish than himself, and this is
why contests can be resolved without injurious fighting,
and why ritual agonistic behavior has become such a
widespread means of distributing resources such as ter-
ritory and social rank between individuals.
Escalation and de-escalation at three brain levels
Decisions to escalate or de-escalate take place either
simultaneously or consecutively at all three levels of the
triune brain (Table I).At the rational,or neomammalian
level, the decision is made consciously and voluntarily
either to fight harder or to back off;when backing off,the
appeasement display may take the form of a graciously
worded apology,or a flowery speech of submission.At the
emotional or limbic level, escalation takes the form of
anger,indignation,and the exhilaration of combat,with
its associated bodily changes;de-escalation at this level
may recruit the dysphoric emotions of anxiety and the
sense of being chastened.Also,since this level involves
the rules of group membership and prestige competition,
guilt and shame also play roles so the appeasement dis-
play typically consists of weeping,blushing,and protesta-
tions of repentance (Table II).At the instinctive level,we
hypothesize that escalation in the reptilian brain takes the
form of elevated mood,giving the individual a prolonged
increase in energy,optimism,self-confidence,and height-
ened sociability all of which function to recruit allies.
Conversely,de-escalation at the instinctive level takes the
form of depressed mood and may include the unfocused
anxiety of GAD,the fatigue of chronic fatigue syndrome,
and the physical disabilities of somatization disorder.
37
The appeasement display at this level communicates this
impairment and disability to any rival or to society as a
whole.Parenthetically,when directed at friends and allies,
the appeasement display takes the form of a distress sig-
nal,sending the message,“I am sick,care for me,and do
not send me into the arena to fight on your behalf.”
38
Prestige competition overtakes agonistic competition
Methods of competition have become more complex over
the course of evolution. Group living lengthened the
duration of contests, so that even in apes a struggle for
dominance may take several months to be resolved.
Instead of fleeing, as happens in territorial species, the
loser could remain in the group with the winner of the
contest,and this gave rise to appeasement or submissive
behavior,which reflects the capacity to live in a subordi-
nate social role.Anxiety and fear of the dominant indi-
vidual,together with relatively low self-esteem and low-
ered mood, enabled the social hierarchy to maintain
stability,and prevent rebellion.At some stage in evolu-
tion, this stabilizing anxiety gave rise to a new way of
relating to a higher-ranking individual:respect.The lead-
ers of the group made themselves attractive to the group
members instead of (or in addition to) intimidating them.
Social rank was then determined by the choice of the
group rather than by agonistic dyadic encounters.The
new self-concept of social attention holding power
(SAHP) began to replace RHP,as group members eval-
uated themselves according to their power to attract inter-
est and investment (such as votes or other forms of polit-
ical support).
39 Related to SAHP is the concept of
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pared to invest in the individual.Prestige competition was
added to,but did not entirely replace,agonistic competi-
tion.
40
The capacity for escalation and de-escalation appears to
have survived the switch to prestige competition, but
takes different forms,at least at the upper two forebrain
levels (Table II).At the highest level, pursuit of goals
replaces the decision to attack,so that escalation consists
in the adoption of new goals,and de-escalation consists
of giving up goals.The goals are usually ones that lead
to prestige,if achieved.Also,on social occasions,escala-
tion takes the form of self-assertion,such as standing up
to speak and promoting one’s own goals, whereas de-
escalation takes the form of self-effacement and allow-
ing other people’s goals to take precedence in the group.
At the emotional level, escalation is less dramatic than
the anger of agonistic competition; it takes the form of
exhilaration, enthusiasm, and self-confidence. De-esca-
lation reflects the fact that punishment comes from the
group rather than from a dominant individual, so there
is social anxiety,guilt,and shame.This is an appeasement
display to the group, expressing contrition for breaking
group rules,or for failing to come up to group standards.
At the instinctive, reptilian level of the forebrain, little
seems to have changed, and elevation of mood repre-
sents escalation, whereas depression of mood, together
with the anxious mood of GAD, represents de-escala-
tion. However, the information that leads to the activa-
tion of the strategy set is clearly different. Instead of
measuring punishment received from the rival,the rep-
tilian brain in some way monitors social standing in the
group, and is sensitive to group approbation and disap-
probation,to comparison of self with other group mem-
bers, and with one’s own aspirations, and to the knowl-
edge of having failed the group in some way and the
likelihood of being found out.
The manifestations of escalation and de-escalation at the
three brain levels are shown for agonistic competition in
Table I and for prestige competition in Table II.
The importance of attachment, equality, and 
cooperation
We have been accused of emphasizing the competitiveness
of human life at the expense of cooperation,equality,and
affiliation.
38We certainly do not deny the importance of
affiliation,and we respect the enormous contribution of
Bowlby who first introduced the idea of attachment and
separation into psychiatry,
41-44 and also his reliance on data
from comparative ethology;nor do we deny that a lot of
psychopathology derives from the loss of attachments,
from death,rejection,infidelity,or boredom.
Even the threat of the death of a spouse may cause both
anxiety and depression.Also,it seems likely,both from
research and experience in the clinic,that adverse expe-
rience with parents in early childhood,leading to insecure
attachment,and also failure to integrate successfully with
the peer-group in adolescence,can predispose to psychi-
atric disorder in later life.
1 Basic research on the way these
early adversities alter brain function is important.
45
From the evolutionary point of view,however,we think
that the roots of depression and anxiety go back further
than the evolution of attachment, at least back to the
common human and reptilian ancestor, who very likely
shared with most present day reptiles the complete
absence of attachment,or family life,or even pair-bond-
ing, and in whom relations with the opposite sex were
restricted to courtship and with the same sex to ritual
agonistic behavior.When attachment evolved, it had a
profound effect on ranking behavior, and even in mon-
keys, let alone apes, rank depends on kinship and
alliances,so that the loss of a powerful patron was prob-
ably the best predictor of a fall in rank.
46,47 Depression
and anxiety following loss thus represent a preemptive
mood change to adjust the individual to lower status.
(This does not apply to the emotion of grief, which is
likely to have other functions.)
The Standard Social Science Model portrays human
ancestors as independent,egalitarian people,much like
present-day hunter-gatherers.
1The inequalities and com-
petitiveness of the developed world were seen as recent
cultural pathologies.It followed from this view that anx-
iety,depression,and other psychopathologies could not
have evolved in the context of social competition.
However, this cultural view greatly underestimates the
power of culture to transform society.Stevens and I have
pointed out that humans have a powerful capacity to
undergo a sudden and radical change of belief system,
and to indoctrinate others into that new belief.
48 It only
takes a single prophet to look around at his competitive
society, in which success is considered good and to be
rewarded,and to pronounce “Success is bad and should
be punished,” for a new society to arise in which, as in
present-day Kalahari Bushmen,success and ostentation
are ridiculed, and an atmosphere of “counterdomi-
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nance” prevails.
49 Thus, we should expect groups of our
ancestors to be wildly culturally divergent, along many
dimensions of variation, but the dimension of equal-
ity/inequality was likely to be a popular one. It only
takes a message of three words (“success is bad”or “suc-
cess is good”) to transform the entire way of life. But,
although the message is short, it is a uniquely human
one.There is no way in which a chimpanzee group could
switch from one ideology to another (even though envi-
ronmental conditions such as food supply have a large
effect on the competitiveness of chimpanzee groups).In
summary, we are saying that our ancestors had the
capacity to live in both equality and inequality,and they
had available,if needed,the behavioral mechanisms such
as depression and anxiety, which made cohesive group
life possible in conditions of inequality.
Implications
In painting this evolutionary scenario of affective disor-
ders,I have passed the white light of escalation/de-esca-
lation theory through the prism of triune brain theory,
and revealed a triptych of three central processing
assemblies operating relatively independently in the
forebrain, each of them responding to the fortunes and
misfortunes of social competition, subserving what
Darwin described as intrasexual selection.
50 The impli-
cation for both research and treatment are fairly clear.
Research into defeat in experimental animals has largely
been initiated and financed by specialties in general
medicine, because defeat, especially when escape is
blocked, causes high blood pressure, renal failure, and
gastrointestinal ulcers,but now it is at last being realized
that these defeated animals,so distressed that their bod-
ily organs are diseased, also suffer from some psycho-
logical upset, and that subordinate animals may suffer
from depression.
51,52 It is now nearly 20 years since
McGuire and his colleagues,
53 reported alterations in
blood serotonin associated with hierarchical position in
vervet monkeys,a finding which is counterintuitive since
the majority of the body’s serotonin resides in the gas-
trointestinal tract, but in spite of this evident break-
through, their findings have not to my knowledge been
repeated by other laboratories,let alone extended.There
is a pressing need for an all-out sociophysiological
assault on the mechanisms of hierarchical behavior.
54,55
In relation to treatment,it is clear that if the rational level
of the brain can sort out the problems of social competi-
tion that the individual encounters,there is no need for
the more primitive levels to introduce their uncomfort-
able solutions, any more than it is necessary for a cold
individual to shiver when he has the alternatives of
putting on more clothes,turning on the central heating,or
migrating to the tropics.The object is to replace uncon-
scious behavioral strategies with conscious,rational ones.
56
This has implications for the time a therapist spends sort-
ing out real life conflicts,as opposed to ventilating emo-
tions and arguing the patient out of depressive thinking.
Also,it illustrates to the therapist how he inevitably enters
the patient’s hierarchical world, to exercise influence,
which may be benign or otherwise.
Depression is more common than elevation of mood,
and this reflects the fact that submission has been a
more useful evolutionary tool than fighting to the death.
Some individuals have easily triggered submissive
responses,
57 on the “smoke detector”principle that sev-
eral false alarms are better than one burning,and there
is likely to be considerable genetic variation in this trait
of dysthymia,
58 which also appears to be sensitized by
adverse experience in childhood. This realization is
important for parents, educationists, and those con-
cerned with primary prevention.
Concealment of affect
I noted above that the rational brain has little control
over the emotional brain (or the instinctive brain), but
to some extent it can conceal the manifestations of affect
mediated by the emotional brain.This applies to both
positive and negative affect.
Concealment of positive affect
The poker player learns to adopt a “poker face,”so that
his opponents cannot see his excitement when he picks
up and looks at a straight flush in his hand. Players of
“quinze”at Almack’s rooms in London in the 18th cen-
tury used to sit around the table wearing masks;
although this reduced the skill and excitement of the
game, it reduced the stress of having to maintain the
poker face.Likewise,the dealer in jade,so the story goes,
knows that his customer will hide his pleasure in seeing
a particularly desirable piece,and so he looks at the cus-
tomer’s pupils, knowing that the pupillary dilation of
excitement is one aspect of positive affect over which the
rational brain has no control.Concealment of negative affect
In some social situations,concealment of negative affect
is not required, for instance, after bereavement. In fact,
exaggeration of negative affect may be required in some
mourning rituals, in which conspicuous voluntary
actions,such as beating the breast,rending garments,and
tearing the hair, may be required to accompany loud
lamentations. However, as a general rule, people are
motivated to hide the manifestations of depression and
anxiety from others. Blushing in the context of shame
and embarrassment presents in the clinic because it can-
not be concealed;indeed,it is considered an “honest sig-
nal” and tells the observer that the person blushing is
biddable and sensitive to social norms.However,this is
a signal that the blusher does not usually wish to send,
preferring to present him or herself as someone with
poise,confidence,and social success.There is truth in the
folk wisdom that, “Laugh and the World laughs with
you;weep,and you weep alone.”
The evolutionary origin of the concealment of negative
affect derives from the behavioral ecology of pairwise
contests,and probably goes back hundreds of millions of
years. In a confrontation between two equally matched
rivals,there is a lot of signaling of size and strength and
determination to win.
32 Clearly, it is in the interest of
each contestant to know the determination of the other,
because if he were able to say to himself,“If only I can
hold out for 10 more minutes without giving in, I know
that my opponent will then give in,”this knowledge will
give him enormous advantage in the fight.Therefore,
each contestant will be motivated to hide any suggestion
of being about to give in until the actual moment of
doing so. Since negative affect is the result of punish-
ment, and associated with the appeasement display of
giving in,the capacity to conceal negative affect is likely
to be selected for.This evolved capacity is augmented by
training, and even by surgery as when the nerves and
muscles of the upper lip are incised to prevent the tell-
tale lip quivering of fear, and so to maintain a “stiff
upper lip.”
The same applies to the social aspects of prestige com-
petition, when individuals try to present themselves as
competent and in charge of the social situation.In most
cultures,in order to promote their own social advantage,
people like to associate with successful others,and avoid
those who show signs of failure.Indeed,in our own cul-
ture it has been found that depressed and anxious indi-
viduals are found to be socially aversive and are avoided
by others.
59,60 On the other hand, there are cultures in
which the demonstration of fearfulness is encouraged;
among the Chewong,
61 an aboriginal tribe in Malaya,the
gods and ancestors are characterized by “fearfulness,
timidity,and retreat in the face of perceived danger,”and
these supernatural beings act as role models for the liv-
ing Chewong, who are proud of their timidity, and
among whom the old men tell tales of occasions when
they have run away.Unfortunately,epidemiological psy-
chiatry has not yet reached the Chewong, so we do not
know whether this cultural endorsement of fearfulness
is associated with an increase or decrease in clinical anx-
iety disorders.However,the Chewong are an exception
to the social rule of concealment of negative affect,and
it seems likely that,on the whole,culture has facilitated
the evolution of the capacity for concealment.
Communication of negative affect to friends and allies
Even among nonhuman primates, and more so among
humans, the result of social competition depends on
friends and allies, usually close kin.The signals of sub-
mission directed at rivals are not directed to allies. On
the contrary, the signal to allies is one of distress, send-
ing the message,“Do not push me into the arena to fight
on our joint behalf, I am unwell (off games), so please
comfort and succor me.”We have pointed out that sub-
mitting people can be quite firm with friends and allies
in getting this message across.
38
When we come to prestige competition, the situation is
more complex.People are motivated to encourage their
allies to perform as well as possible,and in particular par-
ents are motivated to push their children to optimal per-
formance. Female macaques strive to maintain their
daughters in a social rank immediately below themselves,
62
but humans go one better,and parents are notorious for
trying to launch their children into social orbits higher than
their own station;this parental boosting of children must
have evolved in the human lineage because of a correla-
tion between social and reproductive success during the
EEA.We can speculate that the parental boosting contin-
ues until it is switched off by a signal of distress from the
child,indicating to the parent that it has passed its optimal
performance and is now overmotivated.How can we con-
ceptualize the signal of distress in this situation? One pos-
sible answer is to make use of the Yerkes-Dodson Law,
which relates performance to motivation.
Basic research
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This law states that,as motivation increases,performance
rises to a peak and then falls (Figure 1).
63 In other words,
the curve is an inverted U.This means that,for any given
level of performance (except for the peak),there are two
possible readings for motivation,one below the peak,and
one above it.The law also states that the peak for easy
tasks is at a higher level of motivation than the peak for
difficult tasks.Yerkes and Dodson
64 worked with mice
and taught them to avoid a compartment of the cage in
which they received electric shocks:the mice learned bet-
ter with moderate shocks than with either slight or severe
shocks.Also,when task difficulty was varied by changing
the relative brightness of the safe and shocked compart-
ments,the mice learned faster with smaller shocks when
the brightness difference was less,making the task more
difficult. More recently, the law has been confirmed in
human beings
65; using baseball scores as a measure of
performance, and the size of the audience (and the
importance of the game) as a measure of motivation,
researchers found that performance improved as moti-
vation increased; however, in very vital games with a
huge audience, performance was reduced, when pre-
sumably the players were beyond the peak and on the
descending limb of the curve.
If we imagine our ambitious parents promoting their chil-
dren’s success,we can see them tracking their children’s
progress on the Yerkes-Dodson curve,trying to push them
up to peak performance.If they see the children on the
ascending limb of the curve, they know they are under-
motivated and they push the children harder.If they see
that they are on the descending limb,they restrain them
and encourage them to ease off. But how do they tell
which limb of the curve the children are on? One source
of information to the parents is the signal of distress given
out by the children who are being pushed too hard,and
sense themselves slipping down the descending limb of the
curve.This signal of distress is a display of negative affect.
What if the children are highly skilled in the concealment
of negative affect? Then the parents may not realize that
they are on the descending limb,but attribute poor per-
formance to lack of motivation.As a result, they may
push their children even harder,and the children,already
beginning to slide down the descending limb of the curve,
are pushed further down by increased parental pressure.
The Ydler causation
In the clinic, we meet cases in which the children’s dis-
tress has been magnified to the level of illness. I have
described two such cases,
66 both suffering from many
years of anxiety and depression,one complicated by eat-
ing disorder,and the other by repeated self-harm.They
had the following features in common:
•They were well-turned out in dress and self-care.
•Their social manner was poised and concealed their
underlying distress.
•They were conscientious.
•Their parents were ambitious for them.
•The families were close.
• There was no history of childhood ill-treatment,ado-
lescent bullying, or major environmental stress, such as
we usually find in our patients’ histories.
In one case,the patient refused to allow me to meet her
family,and this refusal was a part of her concealment of
negative affect from her parents,who did now know she
was having psychiatric treatment; her illness began
shortly after she went to university, when her parents
were not able to monitor her day-to-day affect. In the
other case,I held a meeting with the parents and siblings,
and it was the siblings who immediately realized the
plausibility of the interpretation, and said that they
themselves had felt the pressure to perform. Even the
parents accepted that they had been bamboozled by
their daughter’s apparent self-control.
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Figure 1. The inverted U-shaped curve of the Yerkes-Dodson Law. The
single-shafted arrow represents the parents’ attempt to push
the child up toward the peak of performance. The double-
shafted arrow represents the actual effect of the parental
pushing.
Reproduced from reference 63: Curtin LL. The Yerkes-Dodson law. Nurs
Manage. 1984;15:7-8. Copyright © 1984: Lippincott, Williams and Wilkins.
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of childI felt that the acronym Ydler was appropriate for this sit-
uation, standing for Yerkes-Dodson limb erroneous
recognition,to be pronounced “idler,”to emphasize that
idlers was something that these young ladies certainly
were not (but seemed to be).
Apart from a suggestion that car accidents should be
classified according to whether the driver was on the
ascending or descending limb,
67 I do not think the
descending limb of the Yerkes-Dodson curve has ever
been analyzed from a diagnostic point of view, but if it
were, then it would probably be found to consist, in its
milder forms, of the appearance of tiredness and tear-
fulness, and in its severer forms, of anxiety and depres-
sion, probably manifesting as physical symptoms. For
some reason, our Ydler patient is failing to make the
appropriate display.As a result,the parents attribute the
poor performance to undermotivation, and mistakenly
think that the child is on the ascending limb of the curve,
and so they keep on pushing,which drives the child fur-
ther down the descending limb,which causes the parents
to push even harder,which drives the child even further
down the descending limb,and so on.
The Yerkes-Dodson law has been criticized because it
assumes a unitary variable of arousal.
68 However, it has
been supported independently and, I think, unknow-
ingly,by Hans Selye’s work on stress.Selye related strain
to stressor,
69 and found a U-shaped curve,so that too lit-
tle stress caused strain, a middling amount caused less
strain, and too much stress caused more strain. If we
identify Selye’s strain as negative performance, and
Selye’s stress as motivation, then Selye’s curve is the
Yerkes-Dodson curve upside down.
Social sharing of nonsocial anxiety
Social anxiety,caused by fellow group members,is usu-
ally a solitary thing,endured by an individual bullied by
a dominant,or by a scapegoat punished by the group.But
anxiety to nonsocial sources of harm is often shared with
other group members,and so becomes a social experi-
ence, modulated by social customs. In some cases, the
group comes together to reduce anxiety,as when chim-
panzees cuddle each other when presented with a stuffed
leopard,and so presumably revive the safety sensations
of the child being cuddled by its mother;in other cases,
the group allocates to an individual the responsibility for
sensing danger,allowing the remainder of the group to
carry out foraging and other activities free from anxiety.
Alarm calls
The alarm calls given by an allocated “sentry” are spe-
cializations of calls given by ordinary individuals in the
group:
“In 1967, T. T. Struhsaker reported that East African
vervet monkeys gave different-sounding alarm calls to
at least three different predators: leopards, eagles and
snakes […] and, in play-back experiments of tape-
recorded alarm calls […] monkeys responded to play-
back of leopard alarm calls by running into trees, to
eagle alarms by looking up in the air or running into
bushes,and to snake alarms by looking down in the grass
around them.”
70
Vervets were later shown to have, in addition to the
above,specific alarm calls eliciting specific responses to
baboons, small carnivores, and unfamiliar humans.
71
Other monkey species also have specific alarm calls,but
apes apparently do not, and human alarm calls would
appear to be as nonspecific as apes, perhaps because
apes and humans are under lesser predation pressure
than monkeys. Giving an alarm call is clearly a disad-
vantage to the individual who gives it,and the adaptive
advantage accrues to close kin, and how this might
evolve has been a concern of evolutionary biology.
33The
misuse of alarm calls has also received attention,in that
animals may give them out of context to manipulate oth-
ers;for instance,New World monkeys have been seen to
give the alarm call when an aggressive subordinate was
making a challenge,with the result that the subordinate
had to abandon the challenge and take his place guard-
ing the periphery of the group;and subordinate great tits
may give an alarm call to dislodge dominant birds from
a feeding perch.
72Alarm calls do not appear to play any
part in the symptomatology of anxiety disorders; for
instance, patients having panic attacks may turn to oth-
ers for comfort,but they do not call “Look out!”or even
“Help!”; nevertheless, the importance of alarm calls in
other primates should alert the clinician to be on the
lookout for them.
The role of sentry
In some groups of social animals (meerkats,dwarf mon-
gooses),the role of anxious individual is allocated to a sin-
gle group member,who sits on a high perch and scans the
surrounding countryside for predators and the air for birds
of prey.The rest of the group can forage without anxiety
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dash for cover.A meerkat who did not trust the sentry,or
was not aware of the sentry’s existence,might be consid-
ered to be suffering from an anxiety disorder.Akiskal
73 has
pointed out that asking an anxious patient to relax may be
like asking a sentry to desert his post.In treating anxiety
disorders,it is important to clarify where responsibility for
safety lies.Perhaps through bad experiences in childhood,
the patient may not trust other people to take on the role
of sentry.Group exercises in which patients are encour-
aged to fall and allow themselves to be caught by other
group members may be helpful in developing an attitude
of trust. In obsessional disorder, the responsibility for
cleaning and checking should be clearly allocated,and the
therapeutic problem may revolve around getting the
patient to trust whoever is responsible.
Avoidance of nonterritory
In the classical case of agoraphobia,the patient feels per-
fectly safe in her own house, but feels extreme panic
when he or she goes out of the front door.Some patients
describe a “glass wall,” which prevents them going out.
In this experience, the agoraphobic patient is similar to
the vast majority of terrestrial mammals, who all lose
confidence and tend to run away from conflict when
they leave what they regard as their home territory.
Even ferocious baboons were seen to fall to the ground
in paroxysms of anxiety when driven across the border
of their group’s territory by primatologist Irven
DeVore.
74 Nonagoraphobic humans share with elephants
the capacity to wander wherever they will over the
globe.The other exception to the agoraphobic rule is the
dispersal of individuals during puberty, when it is com-
mon for one sex to leave the group and join other
groups;for instance,in macaques and baboons the males
leave at puberty, whereas in chimpanzees the females
leave at that time.
75
In many agoraphobics, the inhibition is in the form of a
ring around the house,which,if broken through,allows
nonanxious travel. One of my severely agoraphobic
patients happily traveled around Europe on the back of
her boyfriend’s motor cycle.This reflects our possible
nomadic existence during the EEA,when the restriction
to the summer quarters must be broken for the migra-
tion to the winter quarters. For men, it must be broken
during hunting expeditions,whereas the female role may
be exercised nearer the home base, and many writers
have pointed out that this protects women from attack
by predators,head-hunting neighbors,rape,and gossip,
1,7
and may even protect the marital bond.
76
The literal ownership of territory may be important.One
sufferer recovered when she moved from her own house
into a rented flat, but her agoraphobia returned when
she bought the flat.The knowledge of ownership may
also aggravate obsessional cleaning.
Conclusion
On the face of it,anxiety seems easier than other forms
of psychopathology to tackle from the functional point
of view, because its function in avoidance of harm is
clear for all to see. Parents try to train their children to
be anxious about traffic, strange men, drugs, and other
dangers, which did not appear in the EEA, and so have
no built-in avoidance mechanism.In one unusual case,a
child suffering from congenital indifference to pain was
trained to experience anxiety in situations that normal
children avoid because of pain.
77 However,in other ways
anxiety is more difficult to analyze than,say,depression,
which we have portrayed as a simple,primitive defeated
or submissive strategy.Anxiety is a complex mixture of
cognitive,affective,behavioral,and somatic components,
and it has complex relations to other aspects of motiva-
tion such as arousal. Moreover, there are the following
interesting polarities.
Social versus nonsocial
One does not submit to a predator,and so,to the extent
that one looks on depression as a submissive display,the
function of depression is entirely social,whereas anxiety
has to keep the individual safe from countless nonsocial
dangers in addition to threats from conspecifics.It is dif-
ficult to say,in the case of agoraphobia,for instance,how
much the anxiety saved our ancestors from people
rather than from predators.
Energizer versus paralyzer
Anxiety motivates the individual to escape danger and
work hard to avoid social disgrace. On the other hand,
too much anxiety impairs performance, and may actu-
ally impede attempts to escape or avoid danger.This is
illustrated by the two limbs of the Yerkes-Dodson curve
(Figure 1).
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Anxiety is concerned with the active avoidance of imme-
diate danger,but it also acts as an unconditioned stimu-
lus in the learning of avoidance of dangerous situations.
Certain stimuli appear to have been “primed”by evolu-
tion to be favored as predictors of anxious situations.
9,78
Emotion versus mood
Like depression,anxiety can be mediated by both the lim-
bic and the striatal central processing assemblies of the
triune brain,and we think these two processes reflect the
difference between emotion (anxious about something,
and feel better when that something ceases to be threat-
ening) and anxious mood (unfocused or self-focused,and
indifferent to environmental change) (Table I).
Response to outside versus internal events
Because the human mind can plan ahead,it can predict
that something it is going to do is dangerous.If it is plan-
ning an aggressive or sexual initiative,it can predict that
this may elicit a dangerous response from a more pow-
erful person or the group as a whole.Moreover,because,
due to the repression required for socialization,the early
planning stage of such an initiative may be unconscious,
we may not know what the anxiety is due to.This is the
well-known “signal anxiety,”which is used to good effect
by psychoanalysts.
79
Modular versus nonmodular
Because,famously,evolution is a tinkerer rather than an
engineer,there is no clear separation between different
anxiety responses or the situations that cause them.
Danger may give rise to fight or flight or freezing or jeal-
ousy or washing or checking or to the construction of
fall-out shelters,and all of these activities are accompa-
nied by the dysphoric affect of anxiety.Whereas GAD
is genetically linked to depression and the trait of neu-
roticism,
22 panic disorder and agoraphobia are more
mixed in their inheritance,while specific phobias such as
those of blood, insects, and heights are relatively inde-
pendent.In the case of avoidance of aspects of the habi-
tat such as cliffs and caves, one must suspect that anxi-
ety may have had a function in the splitting of early
human groups,as acrophobics abandoned communities
living on cliff tops and claustrophobics abandoned com-
munities living in caves; rate of group splitting is an
important variable in behavioral ecology, having impli-
cations for the evolution of natural selection at the
group level.
80
Basic concepts
Psychiatry sadly lacks a coherent science of normal
behavior on which to base our study of the pathologi-
cal.
81 Sociophysiology has been suggested as a suitable
title for such a science,
82 and I hope it can be seen from
the above that certain areas of knowledge are necessary
for the appreciation of evolutionary psychiatry.These
include:
•The neuroethology of Paul MacLean’s triune brain.
27
•The changes in social competition (and so sexual selec-
tion) that have occurred since the common reptilian
and human ancestor.
50
•The idea of alternative behavioral strategies (particu-
larly escalation and de-escalation) that has been found
useful in behavioral ecology.
32,33
• Fundamental psychological concepts such as the
Yerkes-Dodson law, which relates performance to
motivation.
64,65
I hope that I have shown how these ideas illuminate the
possible evolution of the anxiety disorders. I am also
confident that these basically untestable ideas are not
just giving an understanding of the human predicament
in a philosophical sense, but are also informing current
research
83,84 and developments in treatment.
57 There is a
pattern there to be seen.As William James
85 put it,antic-
ipating the words of Sir Charles Sherrington with which
I started this paper:
“… Our inner faculties are adapted in advance to the fea-
tures of the world in which we dwell, adapted I mean, so
as to secure our safety and prosperity in its midst […]
Mind and world in short have evolved together, and in
consequence are something of a mutual fit.” ❏
I thank my fellow members of the ASCAP Society for exchange of ideas
over many years. The ASCAP Society (ASCAP stands for Across Species
Comparisons and Psychopathology) is an international organization of
people from various disciplines interested in evolutionary aspects of psy-
chopathology (see www.theascapsociety.net).
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Aspectos evolucionistas de los trastornos de
ansiedad
El daño y el peligro se evitan a través de decisiones
estratégicas que se producen en los tres niveles de la
tríada del prosencéfalo: nivel racional (proveniente
de los neomamíferos), nivel emocional (proveniente
de los paleomamíferos) y nivel instintivo (proveniente
de los reptiles). El peligro potencial de los congéne-
res, sigue este mismo tipo de decisión estratégica con
un posible elección entre una escalada de agresivi-
dad o de sumisión. La ansiedad es un componente de
la estrategia de sumisión que se produce en la parte
del prosencéfalo proveniente de los paleomamíferos
y de los reptiles. Cuando la parte del cerebro prove-
niente de los neomamíferos (racional) no es capaz de
afrontar con éxito una situación de amenaza de con-
géneres, otras estrategias de sumisión más primitivas
pueden activarse y se presentan como trastornos de
ansiedad. La capacidad de disimular la ansiedad y
otras formas de afecto negativo también ha evolu-
cionado. El disimulo excesivo puede conducir a fenó-
menos psicopatológicos al interrumpir el feed back
negativo de la motivación excesiva, lo que conduce
a un deterioro del rendimiento, signos de distrés y
reducción de la incitación al éxito de parte de padres
y profesores; esta situación se ilustra mediante un
modelo que se basa en la ley de Yerkes-Dodson.
Aspects évolutifs des troubles de 
l’anxiété
L’évitement du danger et des risques de préjudice
s’effectue au travers de décisions stratégiques prises
aux trois niveaux du prosencéphale triun : niveaux
rationnel (néomammalien), émotionnel (paléo-
mammalien) et instinctif (reptilien). Ceci s’applique
aussi à l’agression potentielle venant des congé-
nères, ce qui conduit à un choix entre une stratégie
d’escalade de violence ou de soumission. L’anxiété
est une composante des stratégies de soumission
médiée par les prosencéphales paléomammalien et
reptilien. Quand le cerveau néomammalien (ration-
nel) ne réussit pas à circonscrire la menace issue d’un
congénère, ces stratégies de soumission plus primi-
tives peuvent être activées et se présenter comme
des troubles anxieux. La capacité de dissimulation de
l’anxiété et d’autres formes de sentiments négatifs
a aussi évolué, et une dissimulation excessive peut
conduire à une psychologie pathologique en inter-
rompant la boucle du rétrocontrôle négatif d’une
motivation excessive, conduisant à des performances
altérées, à des signaux de détresse, à une diminution
de l’incitation à réussir de la part des parents et des
professeurs ; cette situation est illustrée par un
modèle basé sur la loi de Yerkes-Dodson.
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